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Article

The Morality of Compulsory Licensing as
an Access to Medicines Tool
Margo A. Bagley †
INTRODUCTION
Patents and drug products seem to go hand in hand. 1 The
right to exclude granted by a patent is widely considered
essential to pharmaceutical investment and development. 2
Moreover, the deadweight losses that patents create are
generally considered justifiable for pharmaceuticals, as
companies need to price above marginal cost to recoup
significant fixed development expenses. 3
† Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law,
Hardy Cross Dillard Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
Special thanks to Tom Berg, Anne Coughlin, Cynthia Ho, Caleb Nelson, Ruth
Okediji, and participants at the Patents on Life Conference, St. Edmunds
College, Cambridge University; at my Hardy Cross Dillard Chair lecture at the
University of Virginia School of Law; and at the Georgia IP Scholars workshop.
Thanks also to Joseph Babitz and Shawn Gannon for superb research
assistance, the editors of Minnesota Law Review for their gracious flexibility,
and to the librarians at the University of Virginia Law Library and the Emory
McMillan Law Library for stellar research support. Copyright © 2018 by Margo
A. Bagley.
1. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, Promoting
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCI. 3, 4 (2017) (“Policy
mechanisms to promote biopharmaceutical innovation often focus on fortifying
incentives for firms to develop new products. Biopharmaceutical firms favor
exclusionary rights [such as patents] that defer competition, allowing them to
profit by charging higher prices prior to generic entry.”).
2. See, e.g., Chandra Mohan et al., Patents—An Important Tool for
Pharmaceutical Industry, 2 J. PHARMACEUTICS & NANOTECH. 12, 13 (2014).
3. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry:
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECONS. 20, 21 (2016); see also JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 88, 92 (2008) (distinguishing
between the value of patents in the chemical and pharmaceutical areas from all
other technological areas). Bessen and Meurer further note:
The canonical example of the free-riding problem is traditional drug
development. . . . About 70 percent of this [research and development]
cost is incurred during the clinical trials necessary to obtain
government approval. Generic drug manufacturers are not required to
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However, these exclusionary rights translate to soaring
drug prices in both rich and poor countries, 4 despite global calls
for access to affordable medicines. 5 Yet efforts by governments
to reduce costs, using mechanisms like compulsory licenses,
routinely meet with censure at the hubris of even considering
harm to the patent goose that lays the golden eggs of new
medical breakthroughs. 6
repeat these same clinical trials, so their R&D costs are far less than
those of the original manufacturer.
Id. Similarly, John Duffy argues:
Intellectual property is a special case of a good with declining average
cost. The fixed costs of producing the intellectual property are the costs
of . . . developing an innovation. Once the intellectual property has
been created, the marginal cost of using it an additional time is very
low; in fact, in most cases, it is essentially zero.
John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 40 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and
Barriers to Entry, 25 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 139, 159 (2015); Zaheer Ud
Din Babar et al., Evaluating Drug Prices, Availability, Affordability, and Price
Components: Implications for Access to Drugs in Malaysia, 4 PLOS MED. 466,
467 (2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1831730/pdf/pmed
.0040082.pdf; Sharon Begley, Cancer Drugs, Though Cheaper, in the Developing
World, Remain Unaffordable, STAT (June 6, 2016), https://statnews.com/2016/
06/06/cancer-drug-prices-developing-world; Essential New AIDS Drugs
Unaffordable for Developing Countries, IRIN (July 25, 2007), http://www
.irinnews.org/news/2007/07/25/essential-new-aids-drugs-unaffordable
-developing-countries.
5. For example, Goal 3.B of the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals 2030 includes the targets of supporting “the research and development of
vaccines and medicines for the communicable and noncommunicable diseases
that primarily affect developing countries” and providing “access to affordable
essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.” Sustainable Development Goal 3,
Good Health and Well-Being, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/health (last visited June 18, 2018); see also UNITED
NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL
PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 7 (Sept. 2016), http://z.umn.edu/
UNAccessToMedicines (“Over the last few decades, medical innovation has
dramatically improved the lives of millions of people across the globe. . . .
Despite this noteworthy progress, millions of people continue to suffer and die
from treatable conditions because of a lack of access to health technologies.”).
6. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III and Talha Syed, INFECTION: THE
HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT
IT, ch. 6 (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2017), https://cyber
.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Infection.htm (noting several reasons for the
infrequent use of compulsory licenses despite the strong need for cheaper drugs,
including that “the pharmaceutical firms disadvantaged by compulsory licenses
and the governments of the countries in which those firms are based sometimes
retaliate (or threaten to retaliate) against the countries that use them”);
Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Pros and Cons of Compulsory Licensing: An
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Through compulsory licensing, a nation allows a third party
to practice a patented invention without the patent owner’s
permission, and requires that third party to pay a governmentspecified royalty to the patent owner. 7 A compulsory license does
not require the patent owner to do anything except sit back and
receive the royalties from the third party. But it does prevent the
patent owner from stopping that third party from practicing the
patented invention.
Viewed from a property perspective, criticizing compulsory
licenses might seem quite justified, as the right to exclude is the
paradigmatic feature of private property. However, the very
definition of patents as property remains a contested issue; as
Bessen and Meurer note, “[l]awyers and legal scholars . . . tend
to speak of patents not as a form of property, but as analogous
to other forms of property. Some argue that the analogy might
not be appropriate, others that the analogy is long-standing.”8
This is because patents and other forms of intellectual property
(IP) lack some attributes of property, despite sharing others. For
example, patented subject matter is nonrivalrous (can be used
by multiple parties simultaneously without limit); lacks clear
boundaries; provides minimal notice; and includes the right to
exclude, not the right to use.9 Thus it should not be surprising
that governments would choose to employ, via a compulsory
license, a liability rule (the patent owner is entitled to
Analysis of Arguments, 3 INT’L J. SOC. SCI. & HUMAN 254, 254–55 (2013)
(cataloging arguments against compulsory licenses).
7. CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 127 (2011).
See also Jatinder Mann & Dinesh Kumar, Product Patent in Pharmaceuticals
and Compulsory Licensing, in PATENT LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE MEDICAL FIELD, 113 (Rashmi Aggarwal & Rajinder Kaur eds., 2017)
(noting that the royalty may be “far less than the patent owner could obtain in
a free market”).
8. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 6 (internal citations omitted). They
further note that “[t]oday there is vigorous debate among intellectual property
law scholars between those who generally approve of the propertization of
intellectual property law, and those who do not.” Id. at 30.
9. Id. at 6, 8, 54; see also MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, at I-2 (2016). The authors argue:
The fact that the possession and use of ideas is largely “nonrivalrous”
is critical to intellectual property theory because it means that the
traditional economic justification for tangible property does not fit
intellectual property. In the state of nature, there is no danger of
overusing or overdistributing an idea, and no danger of fighting over
who gets to use it. Everyone can use the idea without diminishing its
value.
Id.

2466

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:2463

compensation for use of the invention) and not a property rule
(the patent holder can preclude use of the invention) for patent
infringement in certain circumstances. 10 Patent rights are not
absolute.
The legitimacy of compulsory licenses under international
law is not truly in question. The United States and several
European countries have issued numerous explicit and de facto
compulsory licenses in various technological areas over the
years.11 Moreover, the 1995 World Trade Organization
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS) ultimately requires 12 all member countries, most of
10. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1092 (1972); Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open
Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 184, 184–85 (2009).
11. See, e.g., James Love, Written Comments and Notice of Intent to Testify
at the Special 301 Public Hearing Monday, February 24, 2014 at the Offices of
USTR, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.keionline.org/
wp-content/uploads/KEI_2014_Special301_7Feb20014_FRComments.pdf. As
Love explains:
[T]he United States itself is [a] major user of compulsory licenses. . . .
[This includes] the extensive nonvoluntary uses of patents and
copyrights under [28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012)], such as the compulsory
licenses benefiting contractors for NASA . . . and the growing number
of compulsory licenses granted by federal judges, when they forgo the
granting of injunctions in patent infringement cases, in favor o[f ]
forward looking royalties as a remedy for infringement [per] eBay[,]
Inc. v. MercExchange. . . . These include a number of medical
inventions. . . . [The] USTR also intervened recently to permit Apple
Computer to import mobile computing devices and iPADs that
infringed on Samsung patents. In recent comments . . . USTR has used
linguistic gymnastics to deny that our USA style nonvoluntary uses of
patent inventions are “compulsory licenses.” But denying the obvious
does not make the obvious invisible to the world.
Id. See also James Packard Love, Recent Examples of Compulsory Licensing of
Patents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 8, 2007), https://www.keionline.org/
book/publications-and-research-notes/kei-rn-2007-2-recent-examples-of
-compulsory-licensing-of-patents (describing the issuance or threat of issuance
of compulsory licenses by a variety of countries).
12. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
for Least Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to
Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. IP/C/73 (Nov. 6, 2015), https://docs.wto
.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/73.pdf (discussing how
least developed country members are not required to provide patents on
pharmaceutical products until 2033). Least developed countries (LDCs) are
United Nations–designated low-income countries confronting severe structural
impediments to sustainable development. List of Least Developed Countries (as
of June 2017), UNITED NATIONS (June 2017), https://www.un.org/
development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf.
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which are low and middle-income countries (LMICs), to
eventually provide patents on pharmaceutical products while
also explicitly allowing compulsory licenses under certain
conditions. 13 Nevertheless, the moral “rightness” of countries in
the global south issuing compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals
seems very much in question, with such tools often being labeled
as theft and otherwise mischaracterized as expropriation. 14
Theft rhetoric in patent law is not new but has a particularly
pernicious effect in this context. Theft rhetoric tends to constrain
policy choices and government actions, overly extending the
boundaries of the patent grant beyond the social bargain for
products that can mean life or death to millions of individuals,
especially those in LMICs.
13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 313–14 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also
Ellen F.M. ’t Hoen et al., Data Exclusivity Exceptions and Compulsory Licensing
to Promote Generic Medicines in the European Union: A Proposal for Greater
Coherence in European Pharmaceutical Legislation, 10 J. PHARMACEUTICAL
POL’Y & PRACT. no. 10:19, 2017, at 6 (“ The right of governments to grant
compulsory licences, including for public non-commercial use, is acknowledged
in international law, including in TRIPS.”).
14. See also Letter from Livia Leu, Swiss Ambassador, to Dr. Carolina
Gomez, Adviser, Colombian Ministry of Health and Social Protection (May 26,
2015), https://www.minsalud.gov.co/sites/rid/Lists/BibliotecaDigital/RIDE/VS/
MET/patent-of-Imatinib-glive-closing-arguments.pdf (criticizing Columbia’s
plan to issue a compulsory license on the cancer drug Gleevic). Leu makes the
following argument:
While compulsory licenses are permissible under the WTO TRIPS
Agreement on the condition of compliance with the terms and
conditions set out in its Art. 31, they are also considered a policy tool of
last resort. A compulsory license is tantamount to an expropriation of
the patent owner and constitutes a deterrent to future research and
development of innovative medicines and their placing on the market
in Columbia. Accordingly, it is our view that . . . all other options are
[to be] exhausted before the issuing of a compulsory license is being
contemplated.
Id. Compulsory licenses are not tools of last resort; as the WTO Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health makes clear, countries have the right
to determine when compulsory licenses are necessary. World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_trips_e.pdf. Moreover, expropriation is the government taking of
private property with little or no compensation; compulsory licenses under
international law require, at a minimum, adequate or reasonable compensation.
See TRIPS, supra note 13, at art. 31(h). See also, Letter from Dr. Deborah
Gleeson et al. to Juan Manuel Santos, President of the Republic of Colombia
(May 16, 2016), https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/5-16-2016-letter
-to-colombia-santos-imatinib-license.pdf (letter from 122 health, intellectual
property, and trade experts defending Colombia’s right to issue a compulsory
license).
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This Article contemplates the validity of theft rhetoric in
relation to the right of countries to grant compulsory licenses
from an unconventional perspective; that of biblical teachings on
what it means to steal.15 Part I describes the use of theft rhetoric
in relation to IP infringement broadly and drug-patent
compulsory licenses in particular. Part II challenges the
contention, suggested by theft rhetoric, that compulsory licenses
are morally wrong as a form of stealing, by considering the
meaning of theft in the context of its Judeo-Christian origins.
Part III considers the cogency of the accusation that the issuance
of compulsory licenses in developing countries destroys
pharmaceutical-company innovation incentives. Part IV
concludes that expanding, as the Bible does, the definition of
theft to include the possibility that a property owner may be
stealing from the poor, can help us to properly evaluate the
morality of drug-patent compulsory licenses.
I. PATENTS, DRUGS, AND THE LANGUAGE OF
EXPROPRIATION
Through the patent mechanism, a government grants an
inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing a patented invention into a country
for the patent term, approximately twenty years from the filing
date.16 Patent rights are territorial, so inventors must apply in
each country or region where they desire protection and the

15. While not common, other legal scholars have applied biblical insights
to legal questions as diverse as environmental ethics, capital punishment,
dispute resolution, and professionalism. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, For
You Also Were Strangers in the Land of Egypt: How Procedural Law and NonLaw Enable Love for “Strangers” and “Enemies,” 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 667,
670 (2010) (discussing professional responsibility and dispute resolution);
Patrick M. Laurence, Note, He Beareth Not the Sword in Vain: The Church, the
Courts, and Capital Punishment, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 215, 219–20 (2003)
(discussing capital punishment); Lucia A. Silecchia, Environmental Ethics from
the Perspectives of NEPA and Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidance for
the 21st Century, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 659, 675 (2004)
(discussing the environment). I, too, have previously used insights from biblical
parables to illuminate issues relating to patents and self-replicating
technologies. See Margo A. Bagley, Grant Me Justice Against My Adversary:
What Parables Can Teach Us About Organic Seed Growers & Trade Assoc. v.
Monsanto Co., in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211 (Irene Calboli and
Srividyha Ragavan eds., 2015); Margo A. Bagley, The Wheat and the (GM)
Tares: Lessons for Plant Patent Litigation from the Parables of Christ, 10 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 683 (2013).
16. TRIPS, supra note 13, arts. 28 and 33.
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resulting patent is only valid in that territory. 17 Moreover,
because patent laws differ by country, an inventor may obtain a
patent in one country and not in another on the same invention.
Broadly speaking, when a third party makes, uses, sells, or
offers to sell an invention in a country, or imports a patented
invention into that country, without the patent owner’s
permission, that third party has engaged in patent
infringement.18 Garden variety patent infringement is a strict
liability offense; no particular mental state is required to violate
a patent owner’s rights.19 Nevertheless, enhanced damages may
be awarded for willful infringement, and, controversially, some
countries even provide criminal remedies for patent
infringement.20 Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that patent
infringement is sometimes characterized as theft. Consider the
following examples:
“What makes patent theft so attractive is that
infringement is not a criminal act and those found guilty
face no jail time.” 21
“The theft (or ‘infringement’) of a patent . . . is typically
handled as a civil matter.” 22
“Licensing is simply a legitimate cost of doing business.
Not paying that cost is theft.” 23

17. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4, Mar.
20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 319 (1979).
18. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
19. See, e.g., id. § 271(a) (containing no scienter requirement for direct
infringement).
20. See J.W. BAXTER ET AL., WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, App.
2A.00 (providing a list of countries with criminal penalties for patent
infringement as of September 2017). See generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle
of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 469 (2011) (discussing criminal penalties in IP law).
21. Pat Choate, Patent Theft as a Business Strategy, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 23, 2010), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/pat-choate/patent-theft-as-a
-busines_b_508780.html (emphasis added).
22. Richard Stim, Intellectual Property Crimes, NOLO: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTYLAWFIRMS.COM, http://www.intellectualpropertylawfirms.com/
intellectual-property/ip-crimes.htm (last visited June 18, 2018).
23. John Wiley, Patent Infringement Is Theft, Plain and Simple, WASH.
POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/
2015/11/17/patent-infringement-is-theft-plain-and-simple. Moreover, President
Donald Trump recently tweeted: “The U.S. is acting swiftly on Intellectual
Property theft. We cannot allow this to happen as it has for many years!”
President Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:38
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/971409845453762560.
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The use of theft framing is not new to IP. Trade secret
misappropriation is often labeled as theft, 24 and in copyright and
trademark law, criminal penalties are available for
counterfeiting, which also involves a close link with the notion of
theft. 25 The ubiquitous FBI notices that appear at the beginning
of copyright protected movies have long linked copyright
infringement and piracy, a form of theft. 26 On some level,
infringement does involve third-party unpermitted use of
something to which a government-granted right attaches, and
certainly some of the types of infringement being characterized
in this way are more egregious than others.
The notion that theft is wrong, that it is even immoral,
derives, at least in part, from the Judeo-Christian roots of the
Ten Commandments and their injunction against stealing.27 The
Ten Commandments, or Decalogue, is known as “the moral
law,” 28 and the violation of many of its tenets, such as those
against adultery, lying, and stealing, are actions widely deemed
immoral or wrong in the United States even today. One striking
example of linking IP infringement to violation of a biblical
precept is found in Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc., where the defendant was accused of sampling a
small portion from one of the plaintiff’s recordings. 29 The opinion
begins as follows:
24. In fact, a few years ago, Congress passed the Theft of Trade Secrets
Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012)).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(1) (“Whoever commits an offense under subsection
(a) [by counterfeiting]—if an individual, shall be fined not more than $2,000,000
or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”).
26. See Anti-Piracy Warning Seal, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
white-collar-crime/piracy-ip-theft/fbi-anti-piracy-warning-seal (last visited
June 18, 2018) (providing a seal containing the phrase “FBI ANTI-PIRACY
WARNING” that owners of a copyright, in works to which criminal penalties for
infringement attach, may use adjacent to the following language: “ The
unauthorized reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work is illegal.
Criminal copyright infringement, including infringement without monetary
gain, is investigated by the FBI and is punishable by fines and federal
imprisonment.”).
27. “ Thou shalt not steal.” Exodus 20:15 (King James).
28. See John A. Eidsmoe, The Use of the Ten Commandments in American
Courts, 3 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 15, 43–44 (2009). Professor Eidsmoe identified 515
cases mentioning the Ten Commandments and a further 331 cases referencing
the Decalogue. Id. at 15. He notes that “these case citations cover a time span
from the early 1800s to the present time, demonstrating an unbroken tradition
of looking to the Ten Commandments as the moral foundation of [U.S.] law.” Id.
at 18–19.
29. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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“Thou shalt not steal” has been an admonition followed since the dawn
of civilization. Unfortunately, in the modern world of business this
admonition is not always followed. . . . The conduct of the defendants
herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also
the copyright laws of this country. 30

When a judge begins his decision with the line, “Thou shalt
not steal,” it is a pretty safe bet that things will not turn out well
for the defendant, and the defendant was found to have infringed
the copyright in that case. Importantly, the judge explicitly
classified copyright infringement as a violation of the biblical
commandment against stealing, a moral wrong. This is not an
isolated occurrence; references to the Ten Commandments have
appeared in at least 846 cases since the early 1800s. As John
Eidsmoe notes, “These usages demonstrate how thoroughly
ingrained into our culture the Ten Commandments have
become, to the point that the usage of this terminology lends
instant recognition and moral authority to the injunctions they
describe.” 31
A surprising number of theft-of-property cases, dealing with
tangible and intangible property, mention the Seventh
Commandment (or Eighth, depending on which version of the
Bible is used). 32 While many of these cases are old, some are
rather new. And while the courts are not explicitly relying on the
Commandment as the basis for the decision, invoking the
biblical admonishment is doing some work for the judge; a link
is being made between the moral law and theft. In Edgenet, Inc.
v. Home Depot USA, Inc., the court also alluded to modern IP
laws as being derived from the Seventh Commandment:
The ancient admonition “thou shalt not steal” expresses a value that is
basic to and underlies the law of property: one cannot freely
appropriate to him or herself what has been produced by the labor,
efforts, or capital of another. While the plaintiff . . . did not formally
allege that the defendants . . . contravened the Seventh

30. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
31. Eidsmoe, supra note 28, at 43–44.
32. See, e.g., Fountain v. State, 109 So. 463, 464 (Fla. 1926) (noting that the
meaning of the word steal “has been pretty thoroughly understood since the
[E]ighth [C]ommandment was brought down from Sinai, or at least since it was
translated into English”); Rochon v. Iberia Par. Sch. Bd., 601 So. 2d 808, 809–
10 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (“One of the commandments is ‘Thou shalt not steal.’
Stealing and theft are synonymous and are criminal acts. . . . So, this Court
holds that theft (especially of these funds) is an immoral act.”); State v. Jim, 508
P.2d 462, 465 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (quoting Cameron v. Hauck, 383 F.2d 966, 971
(5th Cir. 1967) (“ Theft is a synoptic concept: the Eighth Commandment
condemns theft without explaining every possible nuance and contrivance in its
accomplishment.”)).
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Commandment, [the Plaintiff] has accused the defendants of violating
nearly every modern derivation of the biblical edict. 33

It is unlikely that courts and commentators link the moral
law and IP infringement unconsciously or even thoughtlessly,
especially in light of the increasing domestic and international
efforts to criminalize IP infringement. 34 However, such rhetoric
is particularly concerning when compulsory licensing of drug
patents is characterized as theft. With a compulsory license,
national and international law allows a third party to use a
patented invention without the permission of the patent owner,
who is entitled to receive adequate compensation for such use. 35
Theft rhetoric in relation to compulsory licensing employs moral
overtones, and it seems uniquely designed to counter what might
otherwise appear to be a moral obligation to save lives when it
will not harm one to do so. Consider the following examples.
A few years ago, The Wall Street Journal published an oped castigating the Thai government’s issuance of compulsory
licenses on two HIV/AIDS drugs and a heart-disease drug.
According to Boston University School of Law Dean Emeritus
Ronald Cass, Thailand had engaged in “theft”:
The European Union’s trade commissioner . . . recently joined the U.S.
in protesting Thailand’s effective theft of pharmaceutical companies’
intellectual property. . . . [T]here is growing appreciation that
trampling patents to allow a middle-income nation to cut its spending
on drugs seriously threatens the world’s system of protections for
innovation. 36

Though Thailand is considered a middle-income nation, its
per capita gross national income was a mere $5,640 in 2016. 37
One of the op-ed’s striking aspects was the characterization of
Thailand as both ripping off drug companies and harming
33. Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 09-CV-747, 2010 WL
148389, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 12, 2010), aff ’d, 658 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2011).
34. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and
Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 276–79 (2014) (observing an “expansion of the use of
criminal sanctions to deter IP violations” but arguing against the use of those
sanctions in most cases).
35. Because the government generally determines what comprises
adequate or reasonable compensation, there may be disagreement regarding
whether that standard is met in a given case. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43266, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTED
INVENTIONS (2014) (discussing compulsory licensing laws in the United States
and several other countries).
36. Ronald A. Cass, Patent Remedy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2007), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB118824874547610202.
37. Data for Upper Middle Income: Thailand, WORLD BANK, https://
data.worldbank.org/?locations=XT-TH (last visited June 18, 2018).
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innovation, when it was in fact complying with its international
obligations. The license was for the Thai public-health system
and thus constituted “public non-commercial use” within the
meaning of TRIPS Article 31(b). 38 Also, as Jill Johnstone and
James Love noted, the public health reasons for the licenses
were quite legitimate:
In 2006, Thailand had an average per capita income of $8.19 per day.
For the bottom 80 percent of the income distribution, the average was
$5.22 per day. To illustrate the Thai concerns regarding affordability
of products, it is useful to note that the pre-compulsory licensing price
for the heart disease drug Plavix was $2 per day, or nearly 40 percent
of the average income of the bottom 80 percent of the population. 39

Like Cass, other commentators have used theft language to
describe compulsory licenses, including the CEO of
pharmaceutical giant Bayer AG, who characterized a different
compulsory license as “essentially . . . theft.” 40 The Indian
government granted the compulsory license on a cancer drug
that Bayer had priced so high in India that it was available to
only two percent of the patients who needed it. 41

38. See HO, supra note 7, at 134.
39. Letter from James Love, U.S. Co-Chair, and Jill Johnstone, European
Co-Chair, Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Working Group on Intellectual
Property, to Susan C. Schwab, Ambassador and U.S. Trade Representative, and
Peter Mandelson, European Commissioner for International Trade (Mar. 17,
2008), http://test.tacd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/TACD-IP-2008-Letter
-To-S.-Schwab-and-P-Mandelson-on-Compulsory-Licensing.pdf; see also Inthira
Yamabhai et al., Government Use Licenses in Thailand: An Assessment of the
Health and Economic Impacts, 7 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, no. 28, 2011, at 9,
11 (concluding that Thailand’s compulsory licenses resulted in increased access
to the medicines, with no appreciable decline in exports or foreign direct
investment).
40. Ketaki Gokhale, Merck to Bristol-Myers Face More Threats on India
Patents, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-01-21/merck-to-bristol-myers-face-more-threats-on-india-drug-patents;
see also Editorial, Theft, Extortion, and AIDS, CHI. TRIB. (July 6, 2005), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-07-06/news/0507060005_1_compulsory
-licensing-drugs-called-protease-inhibitors-brazilian-congress (“No matter how
you package it, Brazil’s campaign against patents held by U.S. pharmaceutical
firms amounts to international thievery and extortion.”); Nirmal Ghosh, Battle
Rages over Thai Actions on AIDS Drugs, STRAITS TIMES, May, 28, 2007 (Sing.),
2007 WLNR 9967069 (noting that a U.S. lobbying group “accused Bangkok of
‘stealing’ American and European innovation”); Merrill Matthews, Miracle
Drugs Ripped Off, GEELONG ADVERTISER, Dec. 9, 2008, at 15 (Austl.), 2008
WLNR 23639900 (“In Thailand and Brazil, politicians have decided to reward
inventors of medical miracles not with accolades, but with compulsory licenses.
This is a fancy name for simple theft.”).
41. Shamnad Basheer, Bayer ’s Nexavar, Patent Working and Compulsory
Licensing: Mind the (Information) Gap!, SPICYIP (Apr. 27, 2015), https://
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When using this theft rhetoric or framing, commentators
generally send two related but distinct messages: (1) compulsory
licenses are morally wrong because stealing is morally wrong;
and (2) compulsory licenses will harm innovation and society will
not get the new drugs it needs.42
They thus appeal both to moral outrage and understandable
self-interest. Each message will be considered in turn.
II. COMPULSORY LICENSES: MORALLY WRONG OR
MORALLY RIGHT?
First, if compulsory licenses are morally wrong because it is
morally wrong to steal, and the moral wrongness of theft derives
in some measure from the Judeo-Christian moral law embodied
in the Ten Commandments, then it may be instructive to take a
closer look at the meaning of theft under that moral law.
Accusing someone of stealing is a serious matter. In the
Bible, theft is a sin, a violation of a command that is sacred in
Judeo-Christian traditions. However, the Ten Commandments
www.spicyip.com/2015/04/bayers-nexavar-patent-working-and-compulsory
-licensing-mind-the-information-gap.html.
42. See Phil Kerpen, Editorial, Time to Get Tough on India for Stealing All
of Our Stuff, BAXTER BULL., Apr. 21, 2014, at A4, 2014 WLNR 37483767.
Kerpen states:
Quite simply, from pharmaceuticals to motion pictures . . . India is
stealing our stuff. . . . Strong protections for [IP] rights of innovators
are absolutely critical to raise the capital and justify investing it in
developing new cures. The greatest threat to innovation globally now
comes from India’s policies.
Id. (emphasis added); Jasson Urbach, State Will Undercut Itself with New IP
Policy, BUS. DAY, Feb. 28, 2014 (S. Afr.), 2014 WLNR 5917470 (“Compulsory
licences allow the government to break a patent and give a licence to a local
manufacturer to produce a drug. This amounts to state-sanctioned theft of
property. . . . [I]f we weaken drug patents, we will discourage companies and
investors from developing the next generation of medicines.” (emphasis added)).
A more subtle argument by pharmaceutical companies and their governments
is that countries issuing compulsory licenses will not receive significant foreign
direct investment, an assertion that is also not substantiated, as many factors
go into foreign direct investment decisions and IP protection is only one. See Lee
Branstetter et al., Has the Shift to Stronger Intellectual Property Rights
Promoted Technology Transfer, FDI, and Industrial Development? 9
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.people.hbs.edu/ffoley/BFSWIPO.pdf
(last visited June 18, 2018) (“[T]he poorest countries attract little FDI, and a
change in the IPR regime may do relatively little to induce large FDI flows
simply because the degree of IPR protection is only one of many determinants
of inward FDI.”); see also Nitya Nanda, Editorial, This Isn’t Case of Tech Theft,
PIONEER (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/this
-isnt-case-of-tech-theft.html (“ The developed nations’ argument that
compulsory licensing in India will scare foreign investors, is bogus.”).
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do not exist in isolation, but rather as part of a larger and richer
context that both prohibits actions and prescribes affirmative
duties to humankind. As such, the Ten Commandments are far
more than just a bunch of thou shalt nots.
Probably the most illuminating way to think about their
true meaning is through the explanation Jesus gave when, asked
by an expert in the law which was the greatest commandment,
He said:
“Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and
with all your mind.” This is the first and greatest commandment. And
the second is like it: “Love your neighbor as yourself.” All the Law and
the Prophets hang on these two commandments. 43

In other words, Jesus explains that the Ten Commandments,
perhaps surprisingly, are about love. Love for God in the first
four, and love for your neighbor in the last six.
We show love to God by not putting other gods before him, 44
by not bowing down to idols,45 by not taking His name in vain, 46
and by choosing to spend His Sabbath with Him. 47 In terms of
43. Matthew 22:37–40. Jesus’s answer is also repeated in Mark, where it is
footnoted as referring to Deuteronomy 6:4–5 and Leviticus 19:18. See Mark
12:28–34. It also appears, in the context of the lawyer answering Jesus, and
Jesus affirming his answer, in Luke 10:25–28, and serves as a prelude to the
parable of the Good Samaritan. That Jesus is indeed referring to the Ten
Commandments can be further seen in a comparison of Luke 10:25–28 and Luke
18:18–23, in which a rich young ruler also asks Jesus what he must do to inherit
eternal life, and Jesus responds by rattling off the last six commandments
relating to love for one’s neighbor. Then, when the young man states that he
has kept all of those commandments since his youth, Christ tells him: “You still
lack one thing. Sell everything you have and give to the poor, and you will have
treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me.” Luke 18:18–23. Upon hearing this,
the young man became very sad and went away, because he loved money and
his possessions (his idols) more than he loved God. Id.
44. See Exodus 20:2–3 (“I am the Lord your God. . . . You shall have no other
gods before me.”).
45. See id. at 20:4–5 (“You shall not make for yourself an idol in the form of
anything. . . . You shall not bow down to them or worship them; for I, the Lord
your God, am a jealous God.”).
46. See id. at 20:7 (“You shall not misuse the name of the Lord your God,
for the Lord will not hold anyone guiltless who misuses his name.”).
47. See id. at 20:8–11. Exodus further states:
Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Six days you shall labor
and do all your work, but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your
God. On it you shall not do any work, neither you, nor your son or
daughter, nor your manservant or maidservant, nor your animals, nor
the alien within your gates. For in six days the Lord made the heavens
and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, but he rested on the
seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and made it
holy.
Id.
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our love for, or duty to, our neighbor, dishonoring our parents is
not loving, 48 neither is murder,49 nor cheating on our spouses. 50
Nor is lying about our neighbor, 51 or coveting our neighbor’s
possessions. And stealing is definitely not loving. 52
Perhaps because of that love orientation and the context of
duties and obligations, there are explicit instructions in the
Bible regarding a variety of actions that would otherwise be
considered stealing. 53 And some of those actions, embodied in the
Jewish concept of pe’ah, 54 provide an interesting and useful
analogy that can inform the way we think about compulsory
licenses on pharmaceutical patents. The descriptions of pe’ah
can be found in Leviticus chapters 19 and 23, and in
Deuteronomy chapter 24: “When you reap the harvest of your
land, . . . [d]o not go over your vineyard a second time or pick up
the grapes that have fallen. Leave them for the poor and the
alien. I am the Lord your God.” 55 The instructions apply not only
to vineyards but to other crops: “When you reap the harvest of
your land, do not reap to the very edges of your field or gather
the gleanings of your harvest. Leave them for the poor and the
alien. I am the Lord your God.” 56 Similarly, Deuteronomy
48. See id. at 20:12 (“Honor your father and your mother, so that you may
live long in the land the Lord your God is giving you.”).
49. See id. at 20:13 (“You shall not murder.”).
50. See id. at 20:14 (“You shall not commit adultery.”).
51. See id. at 20:16 (“You shall not give false testimony against your
neighbor.”).
52. See id. at 20:17 (“You shall not covet your neighbor ’s house. You shall
not covet your neighbor ’s wife, or his manservant or maidservant, his ox or
donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbor.”).
53. See id. at 20:15 (“You shall not steal.”). To be sure, the Bible does
condemn ordinary theft, and it even requires restitution when someone steals
because they are hungry. See, e.g., id. 21:16 (dealing with kidnapping, which is
stealing someone’s freedom); Id. 22:1–4 (dealing with stealing livestock); Hosea
12:7 (referring to fraud by merchants); Proverbs 6:30–31 (saying one should not
despise a thief who steals because he is hungry, but that he should still be
punished for his crime).
54. In Hebrew, pe’ah means corner or side. See Strong’s Concordance,
BIBLE HUB, http://biblehub.com/hebrew/6285.htm (last visited June 18, 2018).
As Jeffrey Spitzer explains: “The Bible’s model of tzedakah (social justice and
support) included a variety of agricultural gifts. Grain and produce that were
left or forgotten during the harvest were available for the poor to glean. The
corners of the fields (pe’ah) were also designated for the poor.” Jeffrey Spitzer,
Pe’ah: The Corners of Our Fields, MY JEWISH LEARNING, https://www.
myjewishlearning.com/article/peah-the-corners-of-our-fields (last visited June
18, 2018).
55. Leviticus 19:9–11.
56. Id. 23:22. It also is interesting to note that, just as in this verse, God
uses the phrase “the Lord your God” in each of the first four commandments of
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provides: “When you beat the olives from your trees, do not go
over the branches a second time. Leave what remains for the
foreigner, the fatherless and the widow.” 57 Deuteronomy further
provides: “When you are harvesting in your field and you
overlook a sheaf, do not go back to get it. Leave it for the alien,
the fatherless and the widow, so that the Lord your God may
bless you in all the work of your hands.” 58
In these examples, the poor have the right to enter onto the
land of a property owner and harvest the leftovers from the crop.
These are not leftovers after the workers have cleaned every
scrap of salvageable fruit or grain. The property owner is
instructed not to do too good a job in harvesting the crop so that
some portion of the crop is left for the poor and the immigrant
foreigner. In fact, these examples illustrate that loving one’s
neighbor is so important that not only are the poor not stealing
(nor even trespassing), the landowner is enjoined from
harvesting to the edges of his field. Or going back to get the
forgotten sheaf in the field. Or making a second sweep to pick up
missed grapes in his vineyard or missed olives in his olive groves.
What is left does not belong to the landowner and it will not harm
him to let the poor have it. It seems God wanted people to trust
Him, not wealth, to supply their needs.
These overarching concepts are also reflected in Christian
thought and tradition. For example, the Catholic catechism
recognizes the universal destination of goods as being provided
by God for the benefit of the whole human race, 59 and it also
forbids unjustly taking or keeping the goods of one’s neighbor or
wronging him in any way with respect to his goods. 60 Thus, while
it affirms the importance of respect for private property, it also
considers as theft “forcing up prices by taking advantage of the
. . . hardship of another.” 61 And as Baptist theologian Gary
the Decalogue (love for God) but not in the last six (love for neighbor). The use
of this phrase in these gleaning texts suggests that love for God also should
motivate us to love others.
57. Deuteronomy 24:20.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Catechism of the Catholic Church para. 2402, http://www.vatican.va/
archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a7.htm (last visited June 18, 2018).
60. Id. para. 2409.
61. Id. The Catholic Church set forth this position even more forcefully in
a 2001 submission to the World Intellectual Property Organization:
All men and women of all nations are entitled to have whatever they
need for their subsistence and personal advancement, taking it from
all the resources available at any given time in history. The provisions
protecting private property cannot therefore ever lose sight of the
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Gunderson notes, “At the core of every major faith tradition
stands an explicit commitment to be with the sick, the poor, the
alienated, the marginal, the wounded, and the dying. The
commitments are very old, but the implications are forever new
and increasingly radical because of remarkable changes in
health science.” 62
Now to be clear, neither the United States nor any other
Western country is a theocracy, and this Article is not positing
that the Ten Commandments, or even some portion of them, are
the foundation of U.S. law. 63 Nor is it suggesting the adoption of
Levitical approaches to dealing with current day legal issues.
Rather, this Article is: (1) an invitation to consider another
perspective on the meaning of theft, drawn from a text widely
considered as sacred; and (2) an argument that current uses of
theft rhetoric in patent law, to the extent they aim to resonate
with Judeo-Christian notions of morality, are incomplete,
dangerous, and a misapplication of Biblical scripture.
Such uses are incomplete because they do not take account
of the full definition of theft in that Judeo-Christian moral
context, a definition which includes the possibility of the
property owner stealing from the poor. These uses represent a
misapplication of scripture because when one invokes the power
of the Commandment against stealing, one must also import the
common destiny of all goods, so much so that it has to be said that all
private property is subject to a social encumbrance. Consequently,
should there be an institutional conflict between acquired private
rights and overriding community demands, it is for the public
authorities to set about resolving it with active involvement on the part
of individuals and social groups.
World Intellectual Property Organization, Document Submitted by the Holy See
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore for the First Session of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, at 4,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/7 (Apr. 26, 2001).
62. GARY GUNDERSON, DEEPLY WOVEN ROOTS: IMPROVING THE QUALITY
OF LIFE IN YOUR COMMUNITY 5 (1997).
63. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 589 (1983) (“[N]either Jewish thought nor
Jewish law seems to have had any substantial influence on the legal systems of
the West, at least so far as the surviving literature shows.”). This is not to say
that the Ten Commandments and other biblical provisions, as well as the body
of Jewish law that developed around the Torah, has not influenced the common
law; the case law references identified by Professor Eidsmoe attest to that. See
Eidsmoe, supra note 28. However, the influence has not always been explicit.
See Michael J. Broyde, The Hidden Influence of Jewish Law on the Common
Law: One Lost Example, 57 EMORY L.J. 1403, 1403–04 (2008) (providing an
example of the hidden influence of Jewish law on the common law of bailments).
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underlying norms and values embodied in that Commandment.
Such uses are also dangerous because they delegitimize a
government’s moral obligation to provide for the health and wellbeing of its citizens. When governments are threatened with
sanctions for issuing compulsory licenses based on theft framing,
they may be reluctant to issue such licenses to alleviate problems
with access to medicines, and some people may die as a result of
not getting medicines they should have received.
It is perhaps worthwhile to remember that patent rights are
limited property rights at best, and that their contours and scope
are constantly being adjusted through judicial, legislative, and
administrative action. Every court or United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) tribunal invalidation of a patent
based on obviousness is an indictment of an absolute-rights
stance. Governments grant patents to meet utilitarian societal
goals and governments decide the subject matter, scope, and
duration of patents. Two inventors in the same country may
independently work countless hours and develop the same
invention; however, only one of them will receive a patent
claiming that exact invention from that country’s patent office. 64
The United States Constitution authorizes, but does not require,
Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 65
Moreover, an inventor does not have a natural right to a patent.
As Thomas Jefferson eloquently stated:
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the
progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed
in exclusive and stable property. . . . Inventions then cannot, in nature,
be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the
profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas
which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according
to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint
from anybody. 66

64. In rare cases, a patent office may inadvertently issue two patents on
the same invention, but one would be invalid. In the United States, federal law
provides for a civil action to determine which inventor has priority and is
entitled to the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2012).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in
13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333–34 (Andrew A. Lipscomb &
Albert Ellery Bergh eds. 1905). But see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1011–12 (2007) (arguing that
natural rights philosophy undergirded the grant of patents in early America).
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Thus, for example, in eBay v. MercExchange, the United
States Supreme Court concluded that having a right to exclude
does not mean the remedy for the violation of that right is an
injunction. Rather, the statute makes the grant of injunctions
discretionary resulting in many de facto compulsory licenses
where injunctive relief was denied and an adjudged infringer
was able to continue practicing the invention by paying an
ongoing royalty.67 The same Court’s conclusion that isolated
genomic DNA is not patent eligible is also not theft, even though
that decision likely invalidated thousands of patent claims. 68
The fact that there may be important reasons for creating
property rights to allow owners to internalize externalities does
not mean that the owner should be able to internalize all of the
positive externalities.69 Allowing the public to absorb some
beneficial spillovers without positively harming the property
owner can be a virtuous policy choice.
In fact, protecting pharmaceutical products by patent is a
relatively recent phenomenon, even in many highly developed
countries. For example, Germany did not introduce drug patents
until 1968, Italy until 1978, Spain until 1992, and many
developing countries not until 2005 as a result of the WTO
TRIPS Agreement. 70 Because governments create patent rights,
governments can impose appropriate limitations on those rights
without such limitations being theft. Making sure the poor have
access 71 to the drugs they need in order to live, in a way that
67. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006); see also
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader,
J., concurring) (“[C]alling a compulsory license an ‘ongoing royalty’ does not
make it any less a compulsory license.”).
68. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569
U.S. 576, 580 (2013); see also Subhashini Chandrasekharan et al., Do Recent
US Supreme Court Rulings on Patenting of Genes and Genetic Diagnostics Affect
the Practice of Genetic Screening and Diagnosis in Prenatal and Reproductive
Care?, 34 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 921, 921, 925 (2014).
69. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 348–49 (1967).
70. See Ellen ’t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS,
Patents and Access to Medicines for All, J. INT. AIDS SOC. at 2, 4 (2011), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3078828/pdf/1758-2652-14-15.pdf
(discussing Italy and Spain); Bhavan N. Sampat, Intellectual Property Rights
and Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Antibiotics 5 (World Intellectual Prop. Org.,
Econ. Research Paper No. 26, 2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/
wipo_pub_econstat_wp_26.pdf (discussing Germany).
71. Of course, having low-cost drugs produced does not guarantee patient
access to those drugs. There may be several factors at play that impact whether
drugs actually reach needy people. See Lucie White, Getting Real About
Essential Medicines: “The Last Kilometer,” 31 MARYLAND J. INT’L. L. 79 (2016)
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does not harm the patent holder, should be viewed as part of the
social bargain inherent in the patent system and deemed
morally right, not morally wrong.
III. THE FALLACY OF COMPULSORY LICENSES AS
DESTROYERS OF INNOVATION
Regarding the second message, that compulsory licenses
will harm innovation resulting in society not getting the drugs it
needs,72 and that the poor would not have received those drugs
without the patent incentive, two points bear mentioning: (1) we
already are not getting many of the drugs we need; and (2) the
ones we get we often cannot afford. These points arise because
drug companies are incentivized, but not in the ways one might
think.
A. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY INCENTIVES: NOT DRUGS FOR
THE GLOBAL SOUTH
It is instructive to consider big pharma’s profitability and
decisional inputs. The pharmaceutical industry has long been
one of the top five, often top two, most profitable industries in
the world. The numbers are astounding:

(exploring the complex barriers that may exist to getting drugs the last mile, or
last kilometer, to the patients who need them).
72. This argument/threat from pharmaceutical companies arises in
relation to other kinds of price-reduction proposals as well. As Sachs and Frakt
recount:
The response from the pharmaceutical industry [to reduced drug
prices] has been the same: Even if these proposals improve access to
medicines today, they will have a negative effect on innovation in the
future. If the government limits manufacturers’ ability to recoup the
costs of risky research and development, including investments that
fail to lead to marketable drugs, they will simply reduce their
investment in developing new drugs. This could harm all of us. The
drugs we need in the future may not be available.
Rachel E. Sachs & Austin B. Frakt, Innovation-Innovation Tradeoffs in Drug
Pricing, 165 ANN. INTERN. MED. 871, 871 (2016).
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Figure 1: Pharmaceutical Profits, 2013 73

The ability to obtain such profits is, not surprisingly, what
drives big pharma drug development decisions because their
goal, as for-profit corporations, is to maximize shareholder
value. 74 They are not charitable institutions and we should not
expect them to be.
The costs of bringing a drug to market are high and doing so
involves significant risk.75 But innovator companies sell most
73. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Profits, BBC
(Nov. 6, 2014), http//www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223.
74. See Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing Shareholder Value: The Goal That
Changed Corporate America, WASH. POST. (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/maximizing-shareholder-value-the
-goal-that-changed-corporate-america/2013/08/26/26e9ca8e-ed74-11e2-9008
-61e94a7ea20d_story.html (“Driving this change is a deep-seated belief that
took hold in corporate America a few decades ago and has come to define today’s
economy—that a company’s primary purpose is to maximize shareholder
value.”); see also Anneta Konstantanides & Khaleda Rahman, Pharmaceutical
Entrepreneur Who Jacked up AIDS Pill Price by 5,000% Says He Should Have
Charged Even More, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-3347441/Martin-Shkreli-said-raised-price-Daraprim-more.html
(quoting Martin Shkreli, who hiked the price of Daraprim by 5000% overnight,
as saying “[m]y investors expect me to maximize profits, not to minimize them,
or go half, or go 70 percent, but to go to 100 percent of the profit curve that we’re
all taught in MBA class”).
75. See, e.g., Rhona Finkel, The 5 Most Profitable Medications Ever
Produced, DRUGS INFO. & SIDE EFFECTS DATABASE (May 24, 2014), http://www
.drugsdb.com/blog/the-5-most-profitable-medications-ever-produced.html.
Finkel makes the following argument:
It is certainly true that—from the outside—it looks like drug
companies live on easy street . . . but the reality is that they invest
billions of dollars every year into research and development. However
. . . only one out of every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that the companies
study in preclinical trials actually makes its way to market. . . . And of
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drugs so far above marginal cost that the prices more than make
up for the costs of drug development, as their annual profits
clearly show. 76 As described in a World Health Organization
submission, “Launch prices as set by companies are not based on
research and development investment or production costs, but
on the outcomes of economic calculations that aim to identify the
highest possible profit margin the market will tolerate.” 77 Also,
a recent United States Government Accountability Office Study
notes that:
About 67 percent of all drug companies saw an increase in their annual
average profit margins from 2006 to 2015. Among the largest 25
companies, annual average profit margin fluctuated between 15 and 20
percent. For comparison, the annual average profit margin across nondrug companies among the largest 500 globally fluctuated between 4
and 9 percent. 78

Consider for example, imatinib, also known as Gleevec, a
treatment for chronic myeloid leukemia (CML), a disease which
used to be a death sentence but has been turned into a chronic
condition.79 According to an article by 100 CML experts,
imatinib was originally priced at $30,000 per year of treatment
in 2001, and there were 30,000 patients in the United States,
which would generate $900 million per year.80 At that rate, the
developer would recoup the costs of development in its first few
those, very, very few ever become blockbusters. You don’t have to cry
for them—but it is more complicated than it initially appears.
Id.; see also Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now
Exceeds $2.5B, SCI. AM. (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/cost-to-develop-new-pharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b (“CSDD’s
finding, a bellwether figure in the drug industry, is based on an average out-ofpocket cost of $1.4 billion and an estimate of $1.2 billion in returns that
investors forego on that money during the 10-plus years a drug candidate
spends in development.”).
76. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 88 (“ The higher prices that
pharmaceutical firms charge while they are still ‘on patent’ allow them to earn
above-normal profits or ‘rents,’ that more than recoup their development
investments.”).
77. WORLD HEALTH ORG., SUBMISSION TO THE UN SG HIGH LEVEL PANEL
ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 5 (2016), http://z.umn.edu/WHOSubmission (citing
ED SCHOONVELD, THE PRICE OF GLOBAL HEALTH (2011)).
78. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY
PROFITS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND
ACQUISITION DEALS (Nov. 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf.
79. See, e.g., Maggie Fox, Cancer Pill Gleevec Keeps Patients Alive and Well
for a Decade, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/
cancer/cancer-pill-gleevec-keeps-patients-alive-well-decade-n730951.
80. The Price of Drugs for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia (CML) Is a Reflection
of the Unsustainable Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large
Group of CML Experts, 121 BLOOD 4439, 4440 (2013).
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years on the market, and generate profits after that. 81 The drug
was far more successful than anticipated at prolonging life for
CML patients; the ten-year survival rate increased from twenty
percent to eighty percent. 82 However, the price of imatinib
increased over time from $30,000 annual to $92,000 in 2012,
even though all research costs were accounted for in the original
price, new indications were developed, and the patient
population increased dramatically.83
Despite having made tremendous profits from sales of
imatinib, when the government of Colombia announced it was
considering granting a compulsory license on the drug in 2015,
Novartis, the owner of several patents on the drug, engineered
the assertion of significant negative pressure on Colombia. 84
Two sources of the pressure were Switzerland (home to Novartis,
the patent holder) and the United States.85
High profits also reinforce the minimization of risk that
comes from seeking approval for, and introducing new chemical
entities. As a result, pharmaceutical companies have focused
much of their marketing and development efforts on either drugs
for rare indications for which exorbitant prices can be charged, 86
or for me-too drugs with the same mechanism of action as a prior
blockbuster drug and with the same active ingredient, except
now it may be in a different form, dosing regime, et cetera. 87
According to the U.S. GAO, in 2006, sixty percent of new FDA
approvals were for me-too drugs. 88

81. Id. at 4439.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Associated Press, Colombia Is Threatening Novartis over This
Cancer Drug’s High Price, FORTUNE (May 18, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/
18/colombia-novartis-cancer-drug-price.
85. See Leu, supra note 14; Letter to President Santos, supra note 14.
86. See Sara Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, High Prices for Orphan Drugs
Strain Families and Insurers, NPR (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2017/01/17/509507035/high-prices-for-orphan-drugs
-strain-families-and-insurers.
87. See Rosanne Spector, Me-Too Drugs: Sometimes They’re Just the Same
Old, Same Old, STAN. MED. MAG. (Summer 2005), http://sm.stanford.edu/
archive/stanmed/2005summer/drugs-metoo.html.
88. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT:
SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED
AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 17 (2006), https://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0749.pdf.
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Neglected tropical diseases affect more than a billion people
each year. 89 Almost 200,000 people die from these diseases
annually.90 Millions more are so incapacitated by disease that
they cannot work, care for themselves, or care for their
children.91 These diseases predominantly affect the poorest
people in the least-developed countries.92 Yet as Figure 2 from
the European Patent Office shows, pharmaceutical research and
development disproportionately focuses on chronic, noncommunicable diseases, even though many more disabilityadjusted life years are lost for infectious diseases.93 Thus, we as
a global community are already not getting the best mix of drugs
that we need.94

89. See Neglected Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www
.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en (last visited June 18, 2018).
90. The U.S. Government and Global Neglected Tropical Disease Efforts,
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.kff.org/global-health
-policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-and-global-neglected-tropical-diseases/
#footnote-241667-7.
91. See Neglected Tropical Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/ntd/index.html (last visited
June 18, 2018) (explaining that these diseases’ “disfiguring, debilitating, and
sometimes deadly impact” cause significant social stigma as well).
92. Suerie Moon, Powerful Ideas for Global Access to Medicines, 376 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 505, 505 (2017), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMp1613861. In her article, Moon states:
Whether low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are struggling to
treat millions of people living with HIV or to immunize refugee children
against pneumonia, unaffordable prices mean that many people simply
go without. Meanwhile, despite billions of public and private dollars
invested in pharmaceutical research and development, urgent needs
for new antibiotics and tools for other public health priorities go unmet.
Id.
93. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 77 (2007),
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/63A726D28B589B5BC
12572DB00597683/$File/EPO_scenarios_bookmarked.pdf.
94. Moon, supra note 92, at 505; see also REPORT OF THE U.N. SECRETARYGENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 13 (2016), http://z
.umn.edu/UNAccessToMedicines.
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Figure 2: The Global Disease Burden Versus Number
of Compounds in Development 95

In 2014, a whopping forty percent of new drugs approved by
the FDA targeted rare diseases for which high prices and
generous profit margins are common.96 In 2012, such specialty
drugs represented a tiny one percent of prescriptions
nationwide, “but accounted for twenty-five percent of the $263.3
billion spent on all prescription drugs.” 97 With many of the other
approvals being for me-too drugs, we arguably are not getting
enough of the kinds of drug innovations we need for the myriad
diseases currently afflicting patients due to the current system’s
skewed incentives. 98
95. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 93, at 77.
96. John Jenkins, CDER Approved Many Innovative Drugs in 2014, FDA:
FDA VOICE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2015/01/
cder-approved-many-innovative-drugs-in-2014.
97. Laura Fegraus & Murray Ross, Sovaldi, Harvoni, and Why It’s
Different This Time, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www
.healthaffairs.org/action/showDoPubSecure?doi=10.1377%2Fhblog20141121
.042908&format=full.
98. See generally GAO, supra note 88 (explaining the factors contributing
to this dearth of drugs even while pharmaceutical R&D costs have increased).
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B. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY INCENTIVES: EXPENSIVE
“TREATMENTS” FOR THE GLOBAL NORTH
But the adverse effects of the pharmaceutical industry’s
skewed incentives manifest in ways beyond a lack of cures for
the Global South. Throughout the world, even in high-income
countries, companies are incentivized to develop compounds that
turn deadly diseases into chronic conditions so that people can
live longer and keep taking the drug. Pharmaceutical companies
have few incentives to develop cures for diseases. 99 This is not to
say that they never develop cures; sometimes they do, but mostly
they develop treatments because cures are problematic for drug
companies.100 Cures generate a one-time payment, not a revenue
stream.101 If developers price cures too high, they may encounter
significant resistance and censure in the marketplace. The
controversial blockbuster Sovaldi® provides a timely example of
this phenomenon.
Sovaldi—one of the most expensive drugs in history—sells
for $1000 per pill. 102 It provides a treatment and, in up to ninetyfive percent of cases, a cure, for hepatitis C (also called HCV),
which is estimated to affect more than 100,000,000 people
worldwide. 103 In fact, deaths from HCV outnumbered those from
HIV/AIDS in the United States for the first time in 2007. 104
Gilead purchased the startup Pharmasset, in 2011 for eleven
billion dollars in order to acquire sofosbuvir, the active
ingredient in Sovaldi.105 Gilead then finished the FDA approval
process and launched the drug in 2013, following up with the

99. See Finkel, supra note 75 (quoting Martin Kuehne, University of
Vermont chemist: “Pharmaceutical companies don’t like cures. Really, they
don’t—that’s the sad thing. They like treatment. Something for cholesterol or
high blood pressure that you take for years and years, every day. That’s where
the profit is.”).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 114-20, at 129 (2015)
[hereinafter S. REP. NO. 114-20].
103. Id.; Jason Millman, The New $84,000 Hepatitis C Treatment Is Losing
Momentum for Now, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/18/the-new-84000-hepatitis-c
-treatment-is-losing-momentum-for-now.
104. See Kathleen N. Ly et al., The Increasing Burden of Mortality from Viral
Hepatitis in the United States Between 1999 and 2007, 156 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 271, 273 (2012).
105. See S. REP. NO. 114-20, supra note 102, at 1, 3.
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same active ingredient in a different formulation in a drug called
Harvoni in 2014. 106
In its first full year on the market, Gilead made nearly
thirteen billion dollars in net product sales, on the two drugs and
over thirteen billion dollars on Sovaldi and Harvoni during the
first nine months of 2015. 107 So the company earned twenty-six
billion dollars on a product it acquired for eleven billion dollars,
in less than two years.108
A 2015 Senate committee report details the story of how
Sovaldi and Harvoni came to be priced so high, and the answer
is disturbing. The report concluded that:
Gilead asserted that its primary concern in developing and marketing
Sovaldi was to treat the largest number of HCV patients possible. . . .
In reality, Gilead’s marketing, pricing, and contracting strategies were
focused on maximizing revenue—even as the company’s analysis
showed a lower price would allow more patients to be treated. . . .
Significantly, when confronted with the widespread initiation of access
restrictions, Gilead refused to offer substantial discounts and did not
significantly modify its contracting strategy to improve patient
access. . . . [F]ederal healthcare programs . . . have little to no policy
levers at their disposal to significantly impact the price of a single
source innovator drug. 109

106. See id. at 3, 9.
107. See id. at 2.
108. Ly et al., supra note 104, at 273. Sovaldi is a treatment for a disease
that primarily affects poor people, and as such, seemingly should not exist.
However, there is a logical explanation for its development. There are different
genotypes of the HCV virus and interestingly, they differ by geographic region.
So genotypes 1, 2 and 3 are common in the United States, and genotypes 4 and
5 are common in Africa and Asia. S. REP. NO. 114-20, supra note 102, at 6. Not
surprisingly, Pharmassett focused on developing a drug to target genotypes
prevalent in the United States and Europe where they could maximize revenue.
See id. Surprisingly, Sovaldi ended up being a broad-spectrum treatment that
is effective, in combination with other drugs, against all HCV genotypes. See id.
at 10. Thus, in light of the fact that Gilead has so much more than made up for
its R&D costs and garnered abundant profits with more to come in the United
States and other wealthy countries, what should be the global response when
LMICs, like Malaysia, conclude they cannot afford the treatment price and
decide to use a compulsory licensing mechanism?
109. S. REP. NO. 114-20, supra note 102, at 117, 120 (emphasis added). It is
beyond the scope of this paper to address the situation in the United States,
where access to drugs is also becoming a very serious problem for reasons
including, but not limited to, patents. Having compulsory-licensing discussions
in the United States adds a further complexity due to the fact that R&D
decisions are based, in large part, on the U.S. market. See Michael Edwards,
R&D in Emerging Markets: A New Approach for a New Era, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Feb. 2010), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and
-medical-products/our-insights/r-and-38d-in-emerging-markets-a-new
-approach-for-a-new-era. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that when United
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So what does this mean for compulsory licenses in
developing countries? They are often both necessary and
justifiable.110 Pharmaceutical companies are not incentivized to
base their research and development decisions on the possibility
of generating profits in developing countries. They are basing
their decisions on the needs of the United States, Europe, and
other highly developed markets where the bulk of their revenue
originates. 111 The following chart, showing pharma revenue by
region, illustrates this point, showing almost eighty percent of
global pharmaceutical market revenue coming from North
America, Europe, and Japan. 112

States Senator Bernie Sanders proposed a bill to put Sovaldi under compulsory
license after the Veteran’s Administration (VA) ran out of funding for HCV
treatment and was unable to put any more patients on Sovaldi, Gilead reduced
the VA’s price to $600/pill in response. See Patricia Kime, VA, DoD Spend More
Than $450M on Costly Hepatitis Drug, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/08/government-hepatitis-drug-costs/
21462363.
110. As a Malysian HCV report notes:
Sofosbuvir . . . is patented in Malaysia, which means it must be sold at
the originator companies’ proposed Malaysian price (USD $12,000 for
twelve weeks of treatment). Given that it is estimated that the drug
can be produced at USD $171–360 for twelve weeks of treatment, at
volume, pricing is likely to be based on maximisation of profit margins
rather than any rational stratification based on country developmental
levels (as claimed by pharmaceutical companies).
FIFA RAHMAN ET AL., AT THE EDGE OF A MIRACLE: THE HEPATITIS C VIRUS
(HCV) EPIDEMIC IN MALAYSIA 5 (2017), https://aidsdatahub.org/sites/default/
files/publication/At_the_edge_of_a_miracle_HCV_epidemic_in_Malaysia_2017
.pdf.
111. According to Statista, in 2015, global pharmaceutical-market revenues
were $950 billion, up from $712 billion in 2008. Global Pharmaceutical Market
Revenue from 2008 to 2015 (in Billions of U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/266039/global-pharmaceutical-market-revenues
(last visited June 18, 2018). Moreover, “In 2016, the United States was still the
largest single pharmaceutical market, generating almost 450 billion U.S.
dollars of revenue. Europe was responsible for generating around 200 billion
U.S. dollars.” Global Pharmaceutical Sales from 2014 to 2016, by Region (in
billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/272181/
world-pharmaceutical-sales-by-region (last visited June 18, 2018).
112. See Distribution of Global Pharmaceutical Market Revenue from 2010
to 2016, by Region, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/275535/
distribution-of-global-pharmaceutical-market-revenue (last visited June 18,
2018).
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Figure 3: Global Pharmaceutical Market Revenue

When decisions are made about where to invest R&D
dollars, they are made based on wealthy markets. Whatever
drug companies earn in poor countries is largely gravy. Bayer
CEO Marijn Dekkers confirmed this, after calling the Nexavar®
compulsory license “essentially . . . theft,” when he explained: “Is
this going to have a big effect on our business model? . . . No,
because we did not develop this product for the Indian market,
let’s be honest. We developed this product for Western patients
who can afford this product, quite honestly.” 113
This is not to suggest that the relatively small percentage of
revenue is not a meaningful sum which companies would not
wish to lose. Such concerns are arguably why companies that
voluntarily participate in access vehicles like the Medicines
Patent Pool (MPP), as Gilead did with certain HCV patents,
often exclude middle-income countries from the advantageous

113. Gokhale, supra note 40; see also Love, supra note 11, at 4 (“ The Bayer
CEO’s reaction to the Indian compulsory license describes the current reality
for the majority of the world’s population. Many companies find it acceptable to
price products out of reach for the majority of persons living in developing
countries.”).
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pricing deal.114 However, this potential loss of revenue does not
justify pressuring countries to forego compulsory licensing using
theft rhetoric. In both the Thai and Indian compulsory license
examples, the drugs were going to poor people who would not be
able to buy them at the price the originator pharmaceutical
company was charging.115 These were not lost sales; these sales
never would have been made by the patent owner.
Moreover, in situations where the compulsory license is for
public noncommercial use, such as the licenses granted in
Thailand and Malaysia, the generic drugs would only be
supplied to patients in the public health system; rich Thai and
Malay citizens would continue to buy the expensive branded
drugs sold by the patent owner. 116 This is important because
LMICs tend to have high income inequality, a factor that
pharmaceutical firms count on in pricing their drugs. 117 As
Flynn et al. explain in an example involving South Africa, where
the richest ten percent of the population earn fifty-eight percent
of the income:
The [pharmaceutical company] maximizes its sales in South Africa by
selling at the price that only the top 10% can afford. At this price, the
firm makes $814.6 million in total revenue. If the firm lowers its price
to be able to make sales to 20% of the affected individuals (at $396 per
patient), then it will sell twice as many medicines at a price less than
half of the profit-maximizing price, earning substantially less ($435.6
million). As the monopolist continues to cut prices and raise production,
revenues fall further at almost every level of output and corresponding
price. In other words, the firm will maximize its profits by setting a
price unaffordable for at least 90% of people in need. 118

114. See MEDICINES PATENT POOL, https://medicinespatentpool.org (last
visited June 18, 2018) (describing the mission and vison, model, partners and
strategy of MPP); see also Catherine Saez, Malaysia Grants Compulsory Licence
For Generic Sofosbuvir Despite Gilead Licence, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/09/15/malaysia-grants
-compulsory-licence-generic-sofosbuvir-despite-gilead-licence
(noting
that
threat of a compulsory license by Malaysia led to the middle-income country
being offered MPP pricing by Gilead for Sofosbuvir).
115. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
116. See HO, supra note 7, at 168. The impact of such licenses can be
profound. The public noncommercial use-license issued in Malaysia in 2003 for
HIV/AIDs drugs resulted in an 81% reduction in the average cost of treatment
per month-per patient (from $315 to $58) and an increase in government
treatment capacity from 1500 to 4000 patients. See FIFA RAHMAN, supra note
110, at 30.
117. See CHRISTOPHER HOY ET AL., MIDDLE-INCOME TRANSITIONS AND
INEQUALITY: IS THERE A LINK? 13 (2016), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/
files/resource-documents/10383.pdf.
118. Flynn et al., supra note 10, at 189 (emphasis added).
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Because wealthy patients in LMICs can still be expected to
purchase the originator pharmaceutical company’s products,
compulsory licenses are not likely to meaningfully affect even
that further twenty to twenty-five percent of revenue in LMICs.
This also shows that there is little incentive for pharmaceutical
companies to lower their prices in LMICs despite the vast
numbers of people in need of access to their medicines.
This precise scenario resulted in the catastrophic loss of life
on the African continent due to the pricing of HIV/AIDS drugs
out of the reach of millions of poor people in the late 1990s and
early 2000s. As vividly described in the movie Fire in the Blood,
the entire continent of Africa accounted for only one percent of
originator pharma HIV/AIDS drug sales.119 As noted by James
Love in the movie, the entire continent was “a rounding error,”
yet the companies took a hard line, keeping their prices at
$10,000 to $15,000 per patient-per year in Africa, just as in the
United States, and fought against the introduction of generic
drugs while millions of lives were lost. 120
C. THE MORAL “RIGHTNESS” OF COMPULSORY LICENSING
Thus it is worth asking: if the incentive to develop new drugs
is not meaningfully 121 affected by developing country markets,
should a country allow such a drug patent (one most likely
obtained by a foreign entity) to result in lost or impaired lives?
Should we watch people die when it costs nothing, or very little,
to let them live? 122 Or, to put it in the context of pe’ah, shouldn’t
119. See FIRE IN THE BLOOD (Sparkwater India 2013); see also FIRE IN THE
BLOOD, http://www.fireintheblood.com (last visited June 18, 2018) [hereinafter
FIRE IN THE BLOOD, http://www.fireintheblood.com].
120. See FIRE IN THE BLOOD, http://www.fireintheblood.com, supra note 119.
121. This is not to say that there is no possible effect on innovation.
Compulsory licensing makes it even less likely that companies will develop
drugs to treat conditions prevalent in such countries. Nevertheless, as Flynn et
al. note:
[ F ]or markets in which firms can expect demand to be highly convex—
which is likely to be true in markets for medicines in most developing
countries—the patent system will be ineffectual in delivering much
innovation. . . . Ultimately, the problem of finding an adequate and
equitable mechanism to fund research and development for medicines
in developing countries must be found elsewhere.
Flynn et al., supra note 10, at 192 (2009).
122. There is also a self-interest argument for compulsory licenses in the
infectious-disease context. We are living in a world where we are increasingly
seeing global pandemics. See Meera Senthilingam, Seven Reasons We're at More
Risk than Ever of a Global Pandemic, CNN (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.cnn
.com/2017/04/03/health/pandemic-risk-virus-bacteria/index.html. SARS, H1N1,
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the poor have a right to needed drugs when such use of the
patented invention will not harm the patent holder?
Moreover, is it possible that a government has a duty to
allow a third party to provide a drug, via compulsory license or
some other mechanism, to its citizens in a way that will not harm
the patent owner? Certainly. When we consider the broader
meaning of theft illuminated by the biblical concept of pe’ah, we
should be more willing to conclude that a LMIC issuing a
compulsory license is not engaging in theft and its action should
not be characterized as such. We also should be able to recognize
that the poor do have a right to free or low-cost life-saving drugs,
where providing such drugs does not unduly harm the drug
developer.
Issuing a compulsory license in accordance with TRIPS is
not a morally culpable action, and is far removed from theft. It
is not even defined as stealing under international law and
involves compensation to the patent owner. Yet it is too often
characterized as theft in a way that appears to give
pharmaceutical companies the moral high ground and allows
them to play the victim in terms of public relations and inciting
governmental action against offending countries. In fact, it may
be more appropriate to turn the tables and label, from a moral
perspective, the pharmaceutical companies trying to keep
needed drugs from the poor as thieves.
The patent system was never designed to be a guarantee of
maximum profits, rather it is supposed to have a positive impact
on society. As described by the U.S. Supreme Court:
The possession and assertion of patent rights are “issues of great
moment to the public.” A patent by its very nature is affected with a
public interest. As recognized by the Constitution, it is a special
privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the
“Progress of Science and useful Arts.” At the same time, a patent is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market. 123

If, to some extent, our notions of the moral wrongness of
stealing derive from the Ten Commandments, we should not look
at those commandments in isolation, but should consider also
MERS, bird flu, swine flu, Ebola, Zika, the list keeps growing. These diseases
cross borders and oceans. As such, the health of the developing world affects us
all. To the extent more people in the developing world are immune compromised
or lack treatment, there may be a greater spread of such diseases, or the
development of mutations that may affect the ability of HICs to fight these
pandemics when they reach their shores.
123. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815–16 (1945).
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the contextual limitations on that concept. As Professor Gnuse
explains:
Though the gleaning laws are not extensive, they provide us with
significant insight into the command against theft. What the modern
mind might call theft was not so defined in the Old Testament. . . .
Human need had a right of access to the basic essentials of life. . . . For
the poor to take food from another person’s land was not theft, but it
was wrong for the more affluent person to withhold it. 124

Using the label of theft to describe a particular set of actions
and simultaneously playing the innovation card effectively
erects a barrier that may limit a government’s ability to
appropriately utilize compulsory licensing to meet pressing
societal needs. So the hard questions regarding who really is
stealing from whom do not get asked. This theft framing has no
correlation to the most productive innovation, nor to providing
optimal innovation; rather, it is employed to produce optimal
profit.125 In view of the access-to-medicines crisis occurring in
countries across the globe, it is critically important for us to tear
down that barrier.
CONCLUSION
The misapplication of a Biblical precept in the context of
access-to-medicines tools like compulsory licenses in the Global
South is profoundly disturbing, especially in light of the
deafening silence that prevails with respect to the use of
compulsory licenses in the Global North. When we consider the
biblical analogy of pe’ah, it allows us to begin to reframe the
discussion and ask who is stealing from whom. Are our policies
out of balance such that the poor are being robbed of what they
are due? These are not easy issues to address, and there are no
risk-free solutions, no clear way to know exactly how to optimize
access and innovation at the same time. But we may be better
able to get to win-win outcomes if we open our eyes to other ways
of viewing competing interests, and allow our legal discussions
to be enlightened by analogies from important traditions that
have in the past informed our constructions of right and wrong,
and of morality itself.
The value of human life is what makes the production of
essential medicines important and worthy of powerful incentives
124. ROBERT GNUSE, YOU SHALL NOT STEAL: COMMUNITY AND PROPERTY IN
THE BIBLICAL TRADITION 29 (1985).

125. Ramsi Woodcock, Property, Efficiency, the Commons, and Theft, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW 531, 561 (Ugo Mattei
& John D. Haskell eds., 2015).

2018]

MORALITY OF COMPULSORY LICENSING

2495

because they may improve the duration and quality of human
life. But without proper controls, patents and other incentives
may produce harms, which is why the patent system has always
included various limits and safety valves on the scope of the
patent grant. If we consider a just law to be one that improves
the lives of human beings, then drug compulsory licenses issued
in accordance with international law are not only legal, but they
are also moral, and just. Governments have a moral obligation
to provide access to life-saving treatments for their citizens and
the use of incomplete and dangerous theft rhetoric to stigmatize
and denigrate such efforts undermines that duty in profoundly
important ways.
Both patent law and the biblical Commandment against
stealing exist within larger systems of rights and obligations.
Recognizing this allows us to put together, as Christ did, the two
phrasings: thou shalt not steal and thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself. Blending these two phrasings of the commandment
together allows us to view theft in relation to pharmaceutical
patents in its proper light. We can seek and develop appropriate
exceptions to patent rights that do not eviscerate protection, but
provide the balance society needs to enhance access to essential
medicines.

